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The second issue is whether or not defendant Pack as the
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assignee of the beneficial interest of defendant Gunterman, was
a good faith purchaser for valuable consideration.

The

assignment itself, Exhibit 2, recites that the assignment is
made for value received.

Neither defendant Pack nor defendant

Gunterman were present at trial and there was no testimony as
to the amount paid for the assignment.

No evidence was offered

to the effect that defendant Pack was not a good faith
purchaser for value.

In 92 C.J.S. Vendor and Purchaser §371 it

states:
While it has been held that the good faith of purchasers
of land fraudulently transferred to the grantor cannot be
presumed, a purchaser for value under a recorded deed is,
in the absence of evidence to the contrary, presumed prima
facie to be an innocent purchaser in good faith as against
one claimant under a prior unrecorded deed; and where
nothing is alleged to the contrary, it has been held that
it must be assumed that the purchaser is a bona fide
purchaser for valuable consideration. Where a subsequent
purchaser first records his deed, it has been held that
there is a presumption that he acquired his title in good
faith and without notice of the prior unrecorded
conveyance.
In Archuleta v. Anders, 67 N.M. 422, 356 P.2d 443 (1960),
the court stated:
The rule is so well established as to need no citation of
authority, that there is presumption that consideration
was paid and that the purchaser acted in good faith.
Accordingly, since there is no allegation that the assigns
ment was made fraudulently and since there was no evidence to
indicate that the assignment was not made in good faith and for
valuable consideration, defendant Pack must be presumed
11

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
SOUTH SANPITCH COMPANY,
Plaintiff#Appellant,
vs.
DANIEL PACK, MARGARET A.
GUNTERMAN, ACTION TITLE
COMPANY, Trustee, T.P. FAMILY
PARTNERSHIP, HOFFBUHER REDI*
MIX INC., WILLARD M. TUCKER,
PHYLLIS 0. TUCKER, D LAND TITLE
COMPANY, and all unknown
persons who have or claim any
right, title, estate, lien or
interest in the subject
property,

Case No. 860239

Defendants^Respondents.

APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SANPETE COUNTY, STATE
OF UTAH, HONORABLE- DON V. TIBBS PRESIDING
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
PRIORITY CLASSIFICATION 13(b)
BRENT D. YOUNG
JERRY L. REYNOLDS
IVIE & YOUNG
48 North University Avenue
P.O. Box 672
Provo, Utah 84603
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
TEX R. OLSON
Attorney at Law
76 South Main Street
P.O. Box 100
Richfield, Utah 84701
Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent D Land Title Company

LIST OF PARTIES TO PROCEEDINGS
SOUTH SANPITCH COMPANY, Plaintiff/Appellant
BRENT D. YOUNG
JERRY L. REYNOLDS
IVIE & YOUNG
48 North University Avenue
P.O. Box 672
Provo, Utah 84603
D LAND TITLE COMPANY, Defendant/Respondent
TEX R. OLSON
Attorney at Law
76 South Main Street
P.O. Box 100
Richfield, Utah 84701

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1
•

2

PROCEEDINGS BELOW

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS

3

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

5

ARGUMENT

6

POINT I

6

The evidence is undisputed that defendant D Land Title
Company owed a duty to plaintiff to record the deed of partial
release and partial reconveyance within a reasonable time after
its receipt thereof and that defendant D Land Title Company
breached that duty to plaintiff*
POINT II

9

Defendant Pack's interest as assignee of the beneficial
interest of defendant Gunterman constituted an encumbrance
against the subject property and was not affected by the deed
of reconveyance later recorded by defendant D Land Title
Company*
POINT III

16

Plaintiff's damages for defendant D Land Title Company's
negligence in failing to timely record the deed of reconveyance
are properly measured by plaintiff's costs and attorney's fees
incurred in prosecuting an action for quiet title against
defendants Pack and Action Title Company.
CONCLUSION
APPENDIX

19

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED
CASES

PAGE

Archuleta v. Anders, 67 N.M. 422,
356 P.2d 443 (I960)
Kemp v. Zions First National Bank, 24 Utah2d 288
470 P.2d 390
Belnap v. Blain, 575 P.2d 696 (Utah 1978)
W. W. Planning, Inc. v. Clark, 10 Ariz.App. 86,
456 P.2d 406 (1969)
Gray v. Don Miller and Associates, Inc.
674 P.2d 253 (Cal.1984)

11
12
12
14
17

STATUTES
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah

Code
Code
Code
Code
Code
Code

Anno.
Anno.
Anno.
Anno.
Anno.
Anno.

S57«»3*3
§57*1*1
§57*1*19(3)
S57#l«33
§57*1*14
§5741436

9, 1
10,
10
10
12,
13

REFERENCE MATERIALS
92 C.J.S. Vendor and Purchaser §371
59 C.J.S Mortgages §37
489 ALR 190
25 CJS Damages §50e
Restatement 2d Torts §914(2)

ii

11
14
14
16
17

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
SOUTH SANPITCH COMPANY,
Plaintiff*Appellant,
vs.
DANIEL PACK, MARGARET A.
GUNTERMAN, ACTION TITLE
COMPANY, Trustee, T.P. FAMILY
PARTNERSHIP, HOFFBUHER REDI#
MIX INC., WILLARD M. TUCKER,
PHYLLIS 0. TUCKER, D LAND TITLE
COMPANY, and all unknown
persons who have or claim any
right, title, estate, lien or
interest in the subject
property,

Case No. 860239

Defendants^Respondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANfT
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Whether or not the recordation of an assignment of the

deed of trust of defendant Gunterman to defendant Pack prior to
the recordation of the previously executed deed of reconveyance
constituted an encumberance upon plaintiff's title to the
subject property.
2.

Whether or not plaintiff's costs, including a

reasonable attorney's fee, in prosecuting an action to quiet
title to the subject property is a proper element of damage to
be awarded for the negligence of defendant D Land Title Company
in failing to record the deed of reconveyance within a
reasonable time after its execution thereof.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Proceedings Below
Plaintiff brought this action to quiet title to
approximately 10 acres of land located in Sanpete County,
Utah.

Plaintiff joined as defendants its seller, assignees of

its seller, other parties claiming an interest in the property
as well as all unknown persons claiming an interest in the
property, and D Land Title Company who was the trustee of a
trust deed encumbering plaintiff's property.

Immediately prior

to trial, plaintiff entered into a stipulation with defendants
Pack and Action Title Company which stipulation was later
reduced to writing and upon which the court entered a partial
judgment quieting title in plaintiff.

At the beginning of

trial, plaintiff made a motion to amend its complaint to assert
a claim against defendant Willard M. Tucker based on a
promissory note.

Defendant Tucker objected to the motion and

the court denied the same.

The court then dismissed the

proceedings against defendants T.P. Family Partnership and
Willard M. Tucker but specifically allowed plaintiff to pursue
its claim against Willard M. Tucker on the note in a separate
action.
The trial then proceeded on plaintiff's claim against
defendant D Land Title Company for negligence in failing to
timely record the deed of reconveyance.

The court found that

plaintiff had not been damaged by defendant D Land Title
2

Company's delay*

Plaintiff has brought this appeal from the

court's partial judgment awarding defendant D Land Title
Company judgment of no cause of action and from the court's
denial of plaintiff's motion to amend the findings of fact,
conclusions of law and judgment.
Statement of Fact£
On May 18, 1977, plaintiff entered into a uniform real
estate contract to purchase certain real property consisting
approximately 10 acres of unimproved real estate in Sanpete
County, State of Utah, from defendant Hoffbuher RedifMix, Inc.
for the sum of the $12,000.

(Exhibit 4.)

Hoffbuher Redi->Mix,

Inc. quitclaimed its interest in the subject property to
defendant T.P. Family Partnership on November 12, 1980.
(Exhibit 1.)

On August 28, 1981, T.P. Family Partnership,

Willard M. Tucker individually, and Phyllis 0. Tucker
individually, executed a trust deed in favor of Margaret A.
Gunterman, which trust deed secured a promissory note executed
by said trustors to Margaret A. Gunterman in the amount of
$21,000.

(Exhibit 3.)

The real property which is the subject

matter of this action was only a part of the property securing
said indebtedness to defendant Gunterman.

(Exhibit 3.)

Plaintiff's payments under the aforesaid uniform real
estate contract with defendant Hoffbuher Redi^Mix, Inc. were
paid in full.

(Transcript p.32.)

However, in order to obtain

a deed of reconveyance from defendant Gunterman, plaintiff had
3

to pay an additional $4,000 to defendant Gunterman.
(Transcript p.32.)

Defendant Gunterman requested a deed of

partial reconveyance on December 6, 1983, and defendant D Land
Title Company, as trustee under said trust deed executed a deed
of partial reconveyance on December 16, 1983.

(Exhibit 5.)

However, D Land Title Company failed to record said deed of
reconveyance until May 29, 1984.

(Exhibit 5.)

The deed of

reconveyance had been placed on the back of the refrigerator in
the office of one of the officers of D Land Title Company and
forgotten until Roberta Bushell, one of the partners of the
plaintiff partnership, inquired with regard thereto.
(Transcript p.43.)

It is undisputed that the deed of

reconveyance should have been recorded within 10 days after its
receipt by defendant D Land Title Company.

(Transcript p.25.)

When the deed of reconveyance was located, it was immediately
recorded.

(Transcript p.44.)

However, prior thereto, on April

9, 1984, defendant Gunterman executed an assignment of trust
deed, which assigned her interest in the aforesaid trust deed
to defendant Daniel Pack,

(Exhibit 2.)

That assignment of

trust deed was recorded May 1, 1984, prior to the recordation
of the reconveyance from D Land Title Company,

(Exhibit 2.)

On June 4, 1984, defendant Action Title Company was
substituted as trustee of said trust deed and prepared a notice
of default which was recorded on July 26, 1984.

(R. 3, 16.)

Plaintiff brought this action to quiet title to the subject
4

property in plaintiff and to prevent the loss of the property
through the foreclosure action of Action Title Company on
behalf of defendant Pack.

This action was necessitated by

defendant D Land Title Company's negligence in failing to
record the reconveyance within a reasonable time.

The court

entered judgment quieting title in favor of plaintiff and
plaintiff incurred damages in the amount of $2,300 represented
by reasonable attorney's fees and court costs in the bringing
this action.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The first issue raised by plaintiff's appeal is whether or
not the lower court erred in failing to find that plaintiff had
been damaged by the delay of defendant D Land Title Company in
recording the deed of partial release and partial reconveyance
(Exhibit 5). The evidence is undisputed that defendant
Gunterman executed said document on December 6, 1983, and that
the same was received by defendant D Land Title Company and
executed by defendant D Land Title Company on December 16,
1983.

It is also undisputed that the reason the document was

not recorded was because it was merely forgotten.

There is no

question that defendant D Land Title Company owed a duty to
plaintiff to execute and record the deed of reconveyance and
that defendant D Land Title Company breached its duty to record
said document.

(Transcript p.25.)

The only issues left to be

determined are whether or not plaintiff has been damaged by
5

defendant D Land Title Company's breach and the amount of those
damages.
Defendant Pack was a good faith purchaser for valuable
consideration of an interest in the subject real property and
therefore the assignment to him of defendant Gunterman's
beneficial interest in the subject trust deed is an encumbrance
against plaintiff's title to the property.

Had defendant D

Land Title Company timely recorded the deed of reconveyance,
plaintiff's title would be free and clear of encumbrances,
including the interest of defendant Pack.

Plaintiff was

required to bring this action to protect its interest in the
property from being foreclosed by defendant Pack, and therefore
its reasonable attorney's fees in quieting title to the subject
property are recoverable against defendant D Land Title
Company.

The undisputed testimony as to plaintiff's reasonable

attorney's fees in quieting the title to the subject property
is $2,300.

Therefore, judgment should enter in favor of

plaintiff and against defendant D Land Title Company in the
amount of $2,300.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE IS UNDISPUTED THAT DEFENDANT D LAND
TITLE COMPANY OWED A DUTY TO PLAINTIFF TO RECORD
THE DEED OF PARTIAL RELEASE AND PARTIAL RECONVEYANCE
WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME AFTER ITS RECEIPT THEREOF
AND THAT DEFENDANT D LAND TITLE COMPANY BREACHED
THAT DUTY TO PLAINTIFF.
In this case, the operative facts are undisputed.
6

The

controversy is centered on the effect of the recording statutes
on the interests of plaintiff and defendant Pack in the subject
property*

A chronology of the pertinent events is as follows:

1) Plaintiff purchased the subject real property by
uniform real estate contact on May 18, 1977, from Hoffbuher
Redit*Mix, Inc.
2) Hoffbuher Redi4Mix, Inc. quitsclaimed its interest in
the subject property to defendant T.P. Family Partnership on
November 12, 1980.
3) On August 28, 1981, T.P. Family Partnership executed a
promissory note and a trust deed securing said note in favor of
Margaret A. Gunterman in the amount of $21,000, which trust
deed encumbered the subject property as well as other real
estate.
4) On December 6, 1983, defendant Gunterman executed a
document entitled Deed of Partial Release and Partial
Reconveyance (Exhibit 5 ) .
5) On December 16, 1983, the trustee, defendant D Land
Title Company, received said deed of partial release and
partial reconveyance and executed the deed of reconveyance on
December 16, 1983.
6) On April 9, 1984, defendant Gunterman executed an
assignment of trust deed, which assigned her interest in the
aforesaid trust deed to defendant Daniel Pack.
7) On May 1, 1984, the assignment from defendant Gunterman
7

to defendant Pack was recorded.
8) On May 29, 1984, the deed on reconveyance executed by
defendant D Land Title Company was recorded.
In addition to the foregoing facts, it is also undisputed
that defendant D Land Title Company should have recorded said
deed of reconveyance and that a reasonable in which to do so
would have been 7 to 10 days according to the testimony of
Merrill Ogden, an agent of defendant D Land Title Company.
(Transcript p.25.)

Douglas Neeley, an agent of defendant D

Land Title Company at the time the deed of reconveyance was
received by defendant D Land Title Company, described what
happened to the document.

He testified of its delivery to

Jackson Wanlass, an agent of defendant D Land Title Company, as
follows:
Q:

Then what you are saying is that the document was left

with Jackson Wanlass and Jackson Wanlass was instructed to
record.
A:

Yes.

Q:

And you're saying that Jackson Wanlass did not record.

A:

Right.

Q:

Now do you know why he didn't record.

A:

Yah.

It was just forgotten and the only reason it was

remembered is when Mrs. Bushell came back down she asked why it
hadn't been, and that's when we went through the documents
sitting on the back of the fridge to see where it was.

8

Q:

And then you found the document then.

A:

Yes,

And recorded it then, that very day.

From the foregoing, it is clear that defendant D Land
Title Company breached its duty to record the deed of
reconveyance within a reasonable time.

The questions remaining

to be determined on appeal then are whether or not plaintiff
has been damaged by defendant D Land Title Company's breach,
and the amount of those damages.
POINT II
DEFENDANT PACK f S INTEREST AS ASSIGNEE OF THE BENEFICIAL
INTEREST OF DEFENDANT GUNTERMAN CONSTITUTED AN ENCUMBRANCE
AGAINST THE SUBJECT PROPERTY AND WAS NOT EFFECTED BY
THE DEED OF RECONVEYANCE LATER RECORDED BY
DEFENDANT D LAND TITLE COMPANY.
The lower court granted judgment of no cause of action in
favor of defendant D Land Title Company on the basis that the
deed of partial release and reconveyance gave plaintiff
unencumbered title and that the assignment from defendant
Gunterman to defendant Pack did not have any effect on
plaintiff's legal title.
ruling.

However, the lower court erred in so

Utah Code Anno. §57n3#3 reads as follows:

Every conveyance of real estate hereafter made, which
shall not be recorded as provided in this title, shall be
void as against any subsequent purchaser in good faith and
for a valuable consideration of the same real estate, or
any portion thereof, where his own conveyance shall be
first duly recorded.
Consequently, inasmuch as the assignment to defendant Pack
was recorded prior to the reconveyance executed by defendant D
Land Title Company, the assignment to defendant Pack would have
9

priority over the reconveyance if the following conditions are
met:
1.

The reconveyance is considered a conveyance of real

estate.
2.

Defendant Pack was a subsequent purchaser in good

faith and for valuable consideration.
3.

The assignment to defendant Pack was a "conveyance".

Utah Code Anno. §57<B1#1 defines conveyance as follows:
The term "conveyance" as used in this title shall be
construed to embrace every instrument in writing by which
any real estate, or interest in real estate, is created,
aliened, mortgaged, encumbered or assigned, except wills,
and leases for a term not exceeding one year.
Utah Code Anno. §57*1*19(3) provides that:
"Trust Deed" means a deed executed in conformity with this
act and conveying real property to a trustee in trust to
secure the performance of an obligation of the grantor or
other person named in the deed to a beneficiary.
Utah Code Anno. §57#ls33 provides that:
When the obligation secured by any trust deed has been
satisfied, the trustee shall, upon written request by the
beneficiary, reconvey the trust property. The
reconveyance may designate the grantee therein as "the
person or person entitled thereto".
The deed of partial release and reconveyance executed by D
Land Title Company was made in favor of plaintiff as the person
entitled to the release and reconveyance.

Based on the

foregoing statutes, and the term "reconveyance" itself, it can
hardly be disputed that the deed of partial release and
reconveyance executed by defendant D Land Title Company was a
conveyance of real estate as referred to in §57*343.

10

defendant D Land Title Company's breach and the amount of those
damages.
Defendant Pack was a good faith purchaser for valuable
consideration of an interest in the subject real property and
therefore the assignment to him of defendant Gunterman's
beneficial interestack nor defendant
Gunterman were present at trial and there was no testimony as
to the amount paid for the assignment.

No evidence was offered

to the effect that defendant Pack was not a good faith
purchaser for value.

In 92 C.J.S. Vendor and Purchaser §371 it

states:
While it has been held that the good faith of purchasers
of land fraudulently transferred to the grantor cannot be
presumed, a purchaser for value under a recorded deed is,
in the absence of evidence to the contrary, presumed prima
facie to be an innocent purchaser in good faith as against
one claimant under a prior unrecorded deed; and where
nothing is alleged to the contrary, it has been held that
it must be assumed that the purchaser is a bona fide
purchaser for valuable consideration. Where a subsequent
purchaser first records his deed, it has been held that
there is a presumption that he acquired his title in good
faith and without notice of the prior unrecorded
conveyance.
In Archuleta v. Anders, 67 N.M. 422, 356 P.2d 443 (1960),
the court stated:
The rule is so well established as to need no citation of
authority, that there is presumption that consideration
was paid and that the purchaser acted in good faith.
Accordingly, since there is no allegation that the
assignment was made fraudulently and since there was no
evidence to indicate that the assignment Was made in good faith
and for valuable consideration, defendant Pack must be presumed

11

to have been a good faith purchaser for valuable consideration.
The next question is whether or not the assignment from
defendant Gunterman to defendant Pack was also a conveyance
within the meaning of Utah Code Anno. §57*3*3.

Utah Code Anno.

§57#1^1 specifically provides that a mortgage is a conveyance
within the meaning of that statute.

Utah Code Anno. §57«*1?*14

provides in part that a
mortgage when executed as required by law shall have the
effect of the conveyance of the land therein described,
together with all the rights, privledges and appurtenances
thereunto belonging to the mortgagee, his heirs, assigns
and legal representatives, as security for the payment of
the indebtedness thereon set forth, ....
That section provides that a mortgage operates as a
conveyance in favor of the mortgagee and his assignees.

In

Kemp v. Zions First National Bank, 24 Utah2d 288, 470 P.2d 390,
1970, the court equated a trust deed with a mortgage, as did
the court in Belnap v. Blain, 575 P.2d 696 (Utah 1978).

In the

latter case the property was encumbered by three trust deeds
and three judgment liens.

The issue presented was whether or

not the judgment lien of the plaintiff attached to the
defendants1 fee interest in the property inasmuch as the value
of the property did not exceed the prior liens of the trust
deeds and judgments.

The defendant judgment debtor argued that

inasmuch as there was no equity in the property, the
plaintiff's judgment lien did not attach.

12

The court rejected

defendant's argument and stated as follows:
The reference to the judgment debtor's interest means his
estate in the real property; herein identified as a fee
simple. Crowley's estate was in no way diminished or
modified by the encumberances, which consitituted mere
liens or charges against the property. A mortgagee's
interest is no longer an estate, but a mere lien,
incapable of being separated from the debt and transferred
by itself. The mortgagee has no power to recover
possession of the land, his interest is a mere equitable
lien and not an estate. Equity enforces the lien by the
sale of the premises and application of the proceeds upon
the debt.
575 P.2d at 698.
Thus, a trust deed is treated as a lien as is a mortgage.
In the present case, it was defendant D Land Title Company's
position that the interest of the beneficiary under a trust
deed is not an encumberance.

Defendant argued that the trustee

under the trust deed held legal title and that subsequent
conveyances of the beneficial interest in no way affected the
real property.

However, in Belnap v. Blain, supra, the court

held that the beneficial interest under a trust deed is
equivalent to the mortgagee's interest under a mortgage and
that the same constitutes a lien against the real property.
Utah Code Anno. §57^1*14 provides that the assignment of the
mortgagee's interest constitutes a conveyance and Utah Code
Anno. §57*1*36 provides that the assignment of the beneficial
interest under a trust deed may be recorded.
It should be further noted that the assignee of a mortgage
or trust deed is the proper person to enter the satisfaction of
mortgage or request the reconveyance of the property.
13

The

assignee's rights are not affected by some third^party's
release or reconveyance.

In 59 C.J.S Mortgages §374 it states:

The assignee of a mortgage as absolute owner is the proper
person to enter of record the satisfaction of the mortgage
or to give a release thereof. After the assignment the
mortgagee, in the absence of authority conferred by the
assignee, has no power to release or satisfy the mortgage
and the release or satisfaction piece given by the
mortgagee after he has assigned the mortgage is in fraud
of the assignee's rights.
Likewise, in 89 ALR 190, it states:
The recording of the assignment operates as notice to all
of the assignee's rights as against any subsequent acts of
the mortgagee affecting the mortgage. Thus, it protects
them against a subsequent assignment of the mortgage.
It also protects him against a subsequent and unauthorized
discharge and release of the mortgage by the mortgagee.
In W. W. Planning, Inc. v. Clark, 10 Ariz.App. 86, 456
P.2d 406 (1969), the seller of real property reserved the right
to receive a reconveyance free from encumberances from the
purchaser, unless construction began within 18 months of the
sale.

The purchaser then executed a note secured by a mortgage

against the real property which was assigned by the mortgagee.
The assignment of the mortgage was recorded prior to the
recordation of the contract between the seller and purchaser.
The court held that the assignee of the mortgage was a
subsequent purchaser within the meaning of the Arizona
recording statute and that the assignee of the mortgage had
priority over the seller's interest.

The Arizona recording

statute is similar to Utah Code Anno. §57*3*3 and provides in

14

part:
No instrument affecting real property is valid against
subsequent purchasers for valuable consideration without
notice, unless recorded as provided by law in the office
of the county recorder of the county in which the property
is located. A.R.S. §334411
From the foregoing cited authority, it is evident that the
reconveyance of the subject trust deed did not affect defendant
Pack's lien against the property and that plaintiff's interest
in the property was subject to the encumberance in favor of
defendant Pack.

That conclusion is reached not only by the

operative facts falling clearing within the language of Utah
Code Anno. §57^3^3, but also upon consideration of the policy
behind the recording statute.

At the time defendant Pack

purchased the interest of defendant Gunterman, the county
records reflected that the property was subject to a trust deed
in favor of defendant Gunterman in the amount of $21,000.
Defendant Pack would have been entitled to rely upon what the
record disclosed regarding the security for the note purchased
by defendant Pack.

It would be patently unfair for defendant

Pack to be deprived of his security interest in plaintiff's
property by a later recorded deed of partial reconveyance.
Consequently, at the time plaintiff initiated this action, its
title to the subject property was subject to the lien of

15

defendant Pack.
POINT III
PLAINTIFF'S DAMAGES FOR DEFENDANT D LAND TITLE COMPANYfS
NEGLIGENCE IN FAILING TO TIMELY RECORD THE DEED OF
RECONVEYANCE ARE PROPERLY MEASURED BY PLAINTIFF'S COSTS
AND ATTORNEY'S FEES INCURRED IN PROSECUTING AN ACTION FOR
QUIET TITLE AGAINST DEFENDANTS PACK AND ACTION TITLE COMPANY.
Having determined that plaintiff's title was subject to
the interest of defendant Pack# the next issue is the measure
of plaintiff's damages.

Inasmuch as plaintiff has settled the

matter with defendant Pack and the court has quieted title to
the property in plaintiff, plaintiff's out of pocket loss is
related solely to its costs of bringing this action to quiet
title to the subject property.
Although attorney's fees are not generally recoverable in
an action in chief, absent a contract or statute so providing,
attorney's fees are a proper element of damage in a collateral
proceeding.
Where the natural and proximate consequence of a wrongful
act has been to involve plaintiff in litigation with
others, there may, as a general rule, be recovery and
damages against the author of such act of the reasonable
expenses incurred in such litigation, including
compensation for attorney's fees and such costs as may
have been awarded against plaintiff. As similarly stated,
where a person through the tort of another has been
required to act in protection of his interest by bringing
or defending an action against a third person, he is
entitled to recover from the wrongdoer attorney fees and
other expenses incurred in the prior litigation, or where
the breach of the contract has forced one of the
contracting parties to maintain or defend an action
against a third party, he is entitled to recover from the
party breaching the contract attorney's fees and other
expenses incurred in the prior litigation.
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25 CJS Damages §50e.
In Gray v. Don Miller and Associates, Inc., 674 P.2d 253
(Cal. 1984), the court awarded plaintiff damages in the amount
of the attorneyfs fees incurrred for the "tort of another".
The court noted that an exception to the general rule that each
party is to bear his own attorney's fees in the absence of a
statute or contract, is sometimes referred to as the "tort of
another" or "third party tort", which
allows the plaintiff attorney fees if he is required to
employ counsel to prosecute or defend an action against a
third party because of the tort of the defendant. This
rule is embodied in the Restatement of Torts and is
generally followed in the United States (Rest.2d Torts,
§914, subd.(2) adppen.).... The next question is whether
plaintiff is entitled to recover attorney fees on the
basis "of the 'tort' of another" exception to the general
rule because he was required to protect his interest by
bringing an action against the sellers as a result of
Fitch's wrongdoing. We can see no escape from the
validity of plaintiff's claim in "this regard. If Fitch
had no first falsely notified plaintiff that his offer had
been accepted and several months later told him that the
sellers declined to sell the property, plaintiff would not
have incurred attorney fees in seeking to obtain the
property in a suit for specific performance against the
sellers. Thus, Fitch's misrepresentation is the direct
cause of plaintiff's action for specific performance
against the sellers.
674 P.2d at 257, 258.

Restatement 2d Torts, §914(2), provides:

One who through the tort of another has been required to
act in the protection of his interest by bringing or
defending an action against a third person is entitled to
recover reasonable compensation for loss of time,
attorney's fees and other expenditures thereby suffered or
incurred in the earlier action.
In the present case, plaintiff was ehtitled to protect its
interest in the property by bringing this action to quiet title
17

in the property and forestalling the foreclosure proceedings
initiated by Action Title Company, the substituted trustee
under the subject trust deed.

Plaintiff's action to quiet

title resulted from the negligence of defendant D Land Title
Company in not timely recording the deed of partial release and
partial reconveyance.

But for the negligence of defendant D

Land Title Company, plaintiff's action against defendants Pack
and Action Title Company would not have been necessary.
Therefore, plaintiff is entitled to recover its costs and
attorney's fees in pursuing the quiet title action against
defendants Pack and Action Title Company.
The court did not make any finding as to plaintiff's
reasonable costs and attorney's fees in quieting title to the
subject property because the court ruled that plaintiff had not
been damaged by defendant D Land Title Company's failure to
timely record the deed of partial release and partial
reconveyance.

That ruling, however, was made upon the

erroneous assumption that the assignment of the beneficial
interest in the trust deed to defendant Pack and the prior
recordation thereof, did not constitute an encumbrance against
the property.

Plaintiff's evidence of costs and attorney's

fees consisted of testimony of plaintiff's counsel to the
effect that a reasonable attorney's fee in this matter is
$2,300.

In response to the court's inquiry:

"What do you

claim a reasonable Attorneys fees that you're asking for, for
18

damages.

That's what I'm really interested in," plaintiff's

counsel replied: "$2,300".

(Transcript p.37.)

On

cross-examination, defendant D Land Title Company's counsel
inquired as to whether or not separate charges were made
against Mrs. Gunterman.
sir."

Plaintiff's counsel replied, "No,

(Transcript pp.394440.)

However, the court's inquiry was

as to the amount claimed for damages against defendant D Land
Title Company.

That amount was testified to be $2,300.

There

is no evidence that that amount also included the prosecution
of claims against the other defendants.

The court specifically

stated that he did not care what plaintiff's had been charged,
he wanted to know what a reasonable attorney's fee was for
damages.

That amount is $2,300 and is uncontested.

Therefore,

judgment should be entered against defendant D Land Title
Company in the amount of $2,300.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the undisputed evidence presented at trial, the
lower court misapplied the law to the facts of this case in
finding that plaintiff had not been damaged by defendant D Land
Title Company's delay in recording the deed of partial release
and partial reconveyance.

The recordation of defendant Pack's

assignment of the beneficial interest in the subject trust deed
was not affected by the later recordation of the deed of
partial release and partial reconveyance and plaintiff's
interest in the subject property was subject to said
19

assignment*

Plaintiff's action to quiet title to the subject

property was necessary to protect its interest in the property
and plaintiff is entitled to an award of attorney's fees and
costs against defendant D Land Title Company for its negligence
in failing to timely record said deed of partial release and
partial reconveyance*

The amount of said reasonable attorney's

fees and costs is $2,300.

Therefore, the court should reverse

the judgment of the lower court and enter judgment in favor of
plaintiff and against defendant D Land Title Company in the sum
of $2,300.

, 1986.

Dated:

Respectfully submitted,

BRENT D. YOUNG

//

I hereby certify that on this <^2 / day of July, 1986, I
caused to be mailed four true and correct copies of the
foregoing brief to the following:
Tex R. Olson
Attorney at Law
76 South Main
P.O. Box 100
Richfield, UT 84701
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57-1-1

REAL ESTATE
57-1-27.
57-1-28.
57-1-29.
57-1-30.
57-1-31.
57-1-32.
57-1-33.
57-1-34.
57-1-35.
57-1-36.

Sale of trust property by trustee—Public auction—Conduct by attorney for trustee—Trustor may direct order in which trust property sold—Bids—Postponement of sale.
Sale of trust property by ttrustee—Payment of bid—Trustee's deed delivered to purchaser—Rejcitals—Effect.
Proceeds of t r u s t e e d sale—Disposition.
Sale of trust property b y trustee—Corporate stock evidencing water
rights given to secure trust deed.
Trust deeds—Default in performance of obligations secured—Reinstatement—Cancellation of recorded notice of default.
Sale of t r u s t property by trustee—Action to recover balance due upon
obligation for which tr^ist deed was given as security.
Satisfaction of obligation secured by trust deed—Reconveyance of
trust property.
Sale of trust property by trustee—Foreclosure of trust deed—Limitation of actions.
Trust deeds—Transfer of debts secured by—Transfer of security.
Trust deeds—Instruments entitled to be recorded—Assignment of a
beneficial interest.

57-1-1. "Conveyance" defined.—The term "conveyance" as used in this
title shall be construed to embrace every instrument in writing by which
any real estate, or interest in real estate, is created, aliened, mortgaged,
encumbered or assigned, except wills, and leases for a term not exceeding
one year.
History: B. S. 1898 & C. L. 1907, § 1969;
C. I* 1917, §4869; E. S. 1933 ft C. 1943,
78-1-1.
Compiler's Notes.
Analogous former statute, 2 Comp. Laws
1888, § 2645.
Cross-Eeferences.
Insane wife, relinquishment of statutory
interest by, 75-13-22.
Married woman, property rights, 30-2-1
et seq.
"Real property" defined, 68-3-12.
Statute of frauds generally, 25-5-1 et seq.
Wife's interest in real estate of husband,
74-1-1, 74-4-3.
Construction of deed.
A deed should be construed so as to
effectuate the intentions and desires of the
parties as manisfested by the language in
the deed. Wood v. Ashby, 122 U. 580,
253 P . 2d 351.
Contract for sale.
Where contract for sale of property provided that seller was to furnish good and
marketable title and further provided that
if buyer defaulted the seller could keep
the earnest money as liquidated damages,
and before time for performance buyer
repudiated the contract claiming t h a t seller did not furnish marketable title and
buyer did not allow seller a reasonable
time within which to perfect t i t l e ; held
that buyer could not recover the down

payment. Walker v. C. C. Bintz & Shaw,
Inc., 3 U. (2d) 162, 280 P . 2d 767.
"Conveyance."
Under broad definition of term "conveyance" in this section, interest in real property may be conveyed without use of deed.
Stucki v. Ellis, 114 U. 486, 201 P . 2d 486.
Written instrument signed by equitable
owner of premises under contract, reciting
t h a t certain sum had been received from
purchaser as deposit on purchase of premises and specifying purchase price and
terms, when considered in connection with
full payment by purchaser to both equitable and legal owners together with warranty deed executed by latter, constituted
"conveyance" within meaning of this section. Stucki v. EUis, 114 U. 486, 201 P.
2d 486.
"Convey and warrant."
Words "convey and w a r r a n t " suffice to
pass an estate in lands. Haynes v. Hunt,
96 U. 348, 85 P . 2d 861.
Delivery of deed.
Where decedent intended t h a t deed and
bill of sale pass property upon his death,
deed was testamentary in character and
intent and was inoperative since it did not
conform to statutory requirements for
testamentary disposition. First Security
Bank v. Burgi, 122 U. 445, 251 P . 2d 297,
distinguished in 6 U. (2d) 98, 306 P. 2d
773.
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soever to indicate a claim of ownership in
the property, or to protect it, t h a t ho
stood by and let the taxes go delinquent,
and that he permitted the grantor to purchase the outstanding t a x title, and to
continue to pay the taxes for 32 years.
can most reasonably be interpreted as
indicating t h a t the grantor did not actually convey to the grantee, and t h a t the
deed was for some other purpose. Northcrest, Inc. v. Walker Bank & Trust Co.,
122 U. 268, 248 P . 2d 692.
Our statute requires no word of a r t to
quitclaim. I n construing whether an instrument passes title, each case stands on
its own words, combinations thereof, re-

citals, and other a t t e n d a n t facts, having
in mind the rule t h a t generally the instrument is construed in favor of the grantee.
Meagher v. Uintah Gas Co., 123 U. 123, 255
P . 2d 989.
Collateral Eeferences.
Deed8^=*29.
26 C.J.S. Deeds § 22.
Formal requisites, 23 Am. J u r . 2d 99 et
seq., Deeds § 32 et seq.
Eights or interests covered by quitclaim
deed, 44 A. L. E . 1266, 162 A. L. E. 556.
Test of conveyance as quitclaim or
otherwise, 3 A. L. E. 945.

57-1-14. Form of mortgage—Effect.—A mortgage of land may be substantially in the following form:
MORTGAGE
(here insert name), mortgagor, of
(insert place of
residence), hereby mortgages to
(insert name), mortgagee, of
(insert place of residence), for the sum of
dollars, the
following described tract
of land in .
County, Utah,
to wit: (here describe the premises).
This mortgage is given to secure the following indebtedness (here
state amount and form of indebtedness, maturity, rate of interest, by and
to whom payable and where).
The mortgagor agrees to pay all taxes and assessments on said premises, and the sum of
dollars attorneys' fee in case of foreclosure.
Witness the hand of said mortgagor this
day of
,
19
Such mortgage when executed as required by law shall have the effect
of a conveyance of the land therein described, together with all the rights,
privileges and appurtenances thereunto belonging, to the mortgagee, his
heirs, assigns and legal representatives, as security for the payment of the
indebtedness thereon set forth, with covenants from the mortgagor of
general warranty of title, and that all taxes and assessments levied and
assessed upon the land described, during the continuance of the mortgage,
will be paid previous to the day appointed for the sale of such lands for
taxes; and may be foreclosed as provided by law upon any default being
made in any of the conditions thereof as to payment of either principal,
interest, taxes or assessments.
History: K. S. 1898 ft C. L. 1907, § 1983;
O. I * 1917, § 4883; B. 8. 1933 ft O. 1943,
78-1-13.
Cross-Eeferences.
Failure to discharge mortgage after satisfaction, 57-3-8.
Foreclosure of mortgages, 78-37-1 et seq.
Mortgage not deemed a conveyance, 7840-8.

Purchase-money mortgage on homestead
not exempt, 28-1-1.
Eecording assignment of mortgage, 57Conveyance.
Term "conveyance," as used in this section, eovers transactions merely involving
effective mortgage or encumbrance of land
and not transfer of title or estate in view
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forth that he has not, or had not at the time of doing any act pursuant
to the power of attorney, received actual knowledge or actual notice of
the revocation or termination of the power of attorney, by death or otherwise, or notice of any facts indicating the same, shall, in the absence of
fraud, be conclusive proof of the no^revocation or nontermination of the
power at such time. If the exercise of the power requires execution and
delivery of any instrument which is recordable under the laws of this
state, such affidavit (when authenticated for record in the manner prescribed by law) shall likewise be recordable.
History: L. 1945, ch. 82, § 2; C. 1943,
Snpp., 78-1-15.

Collateral References.
Principal and Agent<S=>43(l).
2 C.J.S. Agency § 86.

57-1-17. Report of "missing"—Effect of as notice.—No report or listing, either official or otherwise, of "missing" or "missing in action," as
such words are used in military paijlance, shall constitute or be interpreted as constituting actual knowledge or actual notice of the death of
such principal or notice of any facts indicating the same, nor shall it
operate to revoke the agency.
History: L. 1945, ch. 82, § 3; C. 1943,
Snpp., 78-1-16.

Collateral References.
Principal and Agent<S=»43(l).
2 C.J.8. Agency § 135.

57-1-18. Effect of provisions in po^er.—This act shall not be construed
so as to alter or affect any provision for revocation or termination contained in such power of attorney.
History: L. 1945, ch. 82, § 4; C. 1943,
Supp., 78-1-17.
Section 5 of Laws 1945, ch. 82 provided:
"If any provision of this act or the application thereof to any person or circumstance be held invalid, snch invalidity
shall not affect any other provision or
application of the act which can be given
effect without the invalid provision or
application, and to this end the provisions
of this act are declared to be severable."

Repealing Clause.
Section 6 of Laws 1945, ch. 82 provided:
.ll acts or parts of acts in conflict hereth are hereby repealed."

K

Effective Date.
8ection 7 of Laws 1945, ch. 82 provided
that act should take effect on approval,
Approved March 5, 1945.
Collateral References,
Principal and Agent£=»43(l).
2 C.J.S. Agency § 135.

57-1-19. Trust deeds—Definitions of terms.—As used in this act:
(1) "Beneficiary" means the person named or otherwise designated in
a trust deed as the person for whose benefit a trust deed is given, or his
successor in interest.
(2) "Trustor" means the person conveying real property by a trust
deed as security for the performance of an obligation.
(3) "Trust deed" means a deed executed in conformity with this act
and conveying real property to a trustee in trust to secure the performance of an obligation of the grantor or other person named in the deed
to a beneficiary.
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57-1-21

i£) "Trustee" means a person to whom title to real property is conf, ^ v trust deed, or his successor in interest.
%™ *z\ "Real property" means any estate or interest in land, including all
IL»n4inffS fixtures and improvements thereon and all water rights, rights
2r
v easements, rents, issues, profits, income, tenements, hereditaments,
*** .. * s a n d appurtenances thereunto belonging, used or enjoyed with
E d land, or any part thereof.
i
(B) "Trust property" means the re^l property conveyed by the trust
Js. 1961, ch. 181, § 1.

wm**r.
M 0 » of Act

obligations of parties to trust deeds, and
repealing section 78-37-7, Utah Code Annotated 1953.

E-7I ^ t relating to trust deeds; authorizC f \ £ f e n in trust of real property Collateral References.
sZatinff trustees of trust deeds a power
Mortgages<§»l.
E^Lle providing the manner in which the
59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 5.
I " **jL Qf gale shall be exercised and the
Deeds of trust, 55 Am. Jur. 2d 204 et
held providing for the rights and seq., Mortgages § 15 et seq.

•BT-1-20* Transfers in trust of real property—Purposes—Effect.—Transin trust of real property may be made to secure the performance of
obligation of the trustor or any other person named in the trust deed
s beneficiary. All right, title, interest and claim in and to the trust
BTty acquired by the trustor, or his successors in interest, subsequent
•..the execution of the trust deed, shall inure to the trustee as security
the obligation or obligations for which the trust property is conveyed
i like manner as if acquired before execution of the trust deed.
I* 1961, cb, 181, § 2.
Collateral References,
Mortgages3=>l.
59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 6.

^7-1-21. Trustees of trust deeds—Qualifications.—(1) The trustee of
deed shall be:
(a) Any member of the Utah state b&i,
(b) Any bank, building and loan association, sayings and loan associaor insurance company authorized to do business in Utah under the
\ of Utah or the United States,
(e) Any corporation authorized to conduct a trust business in Utah
* the laws of Utah or the United States,
(d) Any title insurance or abstract company authorized to do business
Jtah under the laws of Utah, or
f e) Any agency of the United States government.
arises (a), (b), (c), (d) and (e) of tnis subsection shall not be applito a trustee of a trust deed existing prior to the effective date of this
r iior to any indenture supplemental thereto.
(2) The trustee of a trust deed shall not be the beneficiary therein,
\ the beneficiary is qualified to be a trustee under clause (b), (c) or (e)
ection (1) of this section.
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57-1-34. Sale of trust property by trustee—Foreclosure of trust deed
Limitation of actions.—The trustee's sale of property under a trust deed
shall be made, or an action to foreclose a trust deed as provided by law for
the foreclosure of mortgages on real property shall be commenced, within
the period prescribed by law for the commencement of an action on the
obligation secured by the trust deed.
History: L. 1961, ch. 181, § 16.

Collateral References.
Mortgages<&=:>345.
59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 558.

57-1-35. Trust deeds—Transfer of debts secured by—Transfer of seenrity.—The transfer of any debt secured by a trust deed shall operate as
a transfer of the security therefor.
History: L. 1961, ch. 181, § 17.

Collateral References.
Mortgages<§=>219.
59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 344.

57-1-36. Trust deeds—Instruments entitled to be recorded—Assignment of a beneficial interest.—Any trust deed, substitution of trustee, assignment of a beneficial interest under a trust deed, notice of default,
trustee's deed, reconveyance of the trust property and any instrument by
which any trust deed is subordinated or waived as to priority, when acknowledged as provided by law, shall be entitled to be recorded, and
shall, from the time of filing the same with the recorder for record, impart notice of the contents thereof to all persons, including subsequent
purchasers and encumbrancers for value, except that the recording of an
assignment of a beneficial interest in the trust deed shall not in itself
be deemed notice of such assignment to the trustor, his heirs or personal
representatives, so as to invalidate any payment made by them, or any
of them, to the person holding the note, bond or other instrument evidencing the obligation by the trust deed.
History: L. 1961, ch. 181, § 1 8 .
Repealing Clause.
Section 19 of Laws 1961, ch. 181 provided: "Section 78-37-7, Utah Code Annotated 1953, is hereby repealed."

Cross-Reference.
Recorder's fees, 21-2-3.
Collateral References.
Mortgages<S=>91.
59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 203.

CHAPTEE2
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Section 57-2-1.
57-2-2.
57-2-3.
57-2-4.
57-2-5.
57-2-6.
57-2-7.
57-2-8.
57-2-9.
57-2-10.
57-2-11.

Manner of acknowledging or proving conveyances.
Who authorized to t a k e acknowledgments.
Acknowledgment by deputy.
Taking acknowledgments of persons with United States armed forces.
Certificate of acknowledgment.
P a r t y must be known or identified.
Form of certificate of acknowledgment.
When grantor unknown to officer.
When executed by attorney in fact.
Proof of execution—How made.
Witness must be known or identified.
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Omission of amount of debt in mortgage
or in record thereof (including general
description without stating amount) as
affecting validity of mortgage, its operation as notice, or its coverage with respect
to debts secured, 145 A. L. E. 369.
Eecord as charging one with constructive notice of provisions of extrinsic instrument referred to in the recorded instrument, 82 A. L. E. 412.
Eecord of deed or contract for conveyance of one parcel with covenant or easement affecting another parcel owned by
grantor as constructive notice to subsequent purchaser or encumbrancer of latter
parcel, 16 A. L. E. 1013.

Eecord of deed to cotenant as notice to
other eotenants of adverse character of
grantee's possession, 82 A. L. E. 2d 5.
Eecord of instrument which comprises
or includes an interest or right that is not
a proper subject of record, 3 A. L. E. 2d
577.
Eecord of instrument without acknowledgment or insufficiently acknowledged as
notice, 59 A. L. E. 2d 1299.
Eights as between purchaser of timber
under unrecorded instrument and subsequent vendee of land, 18 A. L. E. 2d 1162.

57-3-3. Effect of failure to record.—Every conveyance of real estate
hereafter made, which shall not be recorded as provided in this title,
shall be void as against any subsequent purchaser in good faith and for
a valuable consideration of the same real estate, or any portion thereof,
where his own conveyance shall be first duly recorded.
History: R. S. 189S * C. L. 1907, § 2001;
C. L. 1917, §4901; B. S. 1933 * C. 1943,
78-3-3.
Effect of failure to record.
Where, after mortgage was executed on
certain tract of land, owner executed
deed to grantee on property not included
in mortgage, which deed was not recorded,
decree in action to foreclose mortgage on
tract of land, including part conveyed to
grantee, was not binding on grantee who
was not party to such action. Federal
Land Bank of Berkeley v. Pace, 87 U. 156,
48 P. 2d 480, 102 A. L. E. 819.
A judgment lien is subordinate and inferior to a deed which predated it whether
recorded after such judgment or whether
not recorded at all. Kartchner v. State
Tax Comm., 4 U. (2d) 382, 294 P. 2d 790.
Priority.
Innocent purchaser for value without
notice of previous conveyance, who first
records his conveyance, takes preference
over prior unrecorded conveyance. McGarry v. Thompson, 114 U. 442, 201 P. 2d
288, involving priority as between assignments of application to appropriate unappropriated public water under 73-3-18,
citing Wells, Fargo & Co. v. Smith, 2 U.
39, affd. 104 U. S. 428, 26 L. Ed. 802.
Later in time but prior recorded first
mortgage took precedence over purchase
money mortgage where mortgagee had
no notice of the purchase money mortgage.
Kemp v. Zions First Nat. Bank, 24 U.
(2d) 288, 470 P. 2d 390.

Words and phrases defined.
This section does not define what is
meant by the word "recorded." Boyer v.
Pahvant Mercantile & Investment Co., 76
U. 1, 287 P. 188.
Mortgage lien is included in term "conveyance" as used in this section, mortgagee is purchaser, and law of priority of
record applies to mortgages. Federal Land
Bank of Berkeley v. Pace, 87 U. 156, 48
P. 2d 480,102 A. L. E. 819.
Collateral References.
Vendor and Purchaser<S»233.
92 C.J.S. Vendor and Purchaser § 345.
Failure to record, 66 Am. Jur. 2d 437 et
seq., Eecords and Recording Laws § 156
et seq.
Agreement between real estate owners
restricting use of property as within contemplation of recording laws, 4 A. L. E.
2d 1419.
Presumption and burden of proof as
regards good faith and consideration on
art of purchaser or one taking encumrance subsequent to unrecorded conveyance or encumbrance, 107 A. L. E. 502.
Purchase-money mortgage as within provision of statute defeating or postponing
lien of unrecorded or unfiled mortgage,
137 A. L. E. 571, 168 A. L. B. 1164.
Bight of one otherwise protected by recording law against prior unrecorded deed
or mortgage as affected by fact that all
or part of the consideration was unpaid
at the time he received notice, actual or
constructive, of the prior instrument, 109
4 . L. B. 163.
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SANPETE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * * * * * * *

SOUTH SANPITCH COMPANY,

)

Plaintiff,
-vsDANIEL PACK; MARGARET A.
GUNTERMAN; ACTION TITLE COMPANY,)
TRUSTEE; T. P. FAMILY PARTNERSHIP; HOFFBUHER REDI-MIX INC.;
WILLARD M. TUCKER; PHYLLIS 0.
TUCKER; D LAND TITLE COMPANY;
and all unknown persons who
have or claim any right, title
estate, lien or interest in
the subject property,

JUDGMENT OF NO CAUSE OF
ACTION AGAINST PLAINTIFF
AND IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT
D LAND TITLE COMPANY;

Defendants,
ORDER DISMISSING
C|ROSS-COMPLAINT.

D LAND TITLE COMPANY,
Third-Party
Plaintiff,
-vsCivil No. 8978

NORMA S. WANLASS,
Third-Party
Defendant.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

The above-entitled matter came oh regularly for hearing
before the Honorable Don V. Tibbs, District Judge, sitting at Manti,
Sanpete County, State of Utah, on Monday, the 10th day of February,
1986.

The Plaintiff appeared through its attorneys, Brent D. Young

and Jerry L. Reynolds of Ivie & Young, 48 North University Avenue,
P.O. Box 672, Provo, Utah and the Defendant, T.P. Family Partnership

- /OF -

- 2appeared through its attorney, Phillip L. Foremaster, and Defendant
Willard M. Tucker appeared in person and with his attorney, Phillip
L. Foremaster, and Defendant Daniel Pack having appeared through his
attorney, Mark F. Robinson, and Plaintiff and the parties Defendant,
with the exception of D Land Title having settled their claims by
stipulation

and D Land Title and Cross-Defendant

Norma Wanlass

having stipulated that any issues remaining upon the the crossclaim
be reserved for further proceedings and the Court having heard the
sworn testimony offered in support of Plaintiff!s claim against D
Land Title and having examined documentary evidence and the Court
having heard arguments of counsel and having made its Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law;
IT IS NOW ORDERED:
1.

Defendant D Land Title is granted a judgment of no

cause of action and its costs on Plaintifffs claim for damages
against D Land Title.
2.

Since no issues remain again$t Cross-Defendant Norma

Wanlass, the pending Cross-Complaint is hereby dismissed.
DATED this

<•• -
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TEX R. OLSEN
NO. 2467
OLSEN AND CHAMBERLAIN
ATTORNEYS F™
DEFENDANT D LAND TITLE
7 6 SOUTH MAIN STREET
RICHFIELD, UTAH 8 4 7 0 1
TELEPHONE: 896-4461
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SANPETE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * * * * * * *

SOUTH SANPITCH COMPANY,

)

Plaintiff,
-vsDANIEL PACK; MARGARET A.
GUNTERMAN; ACTION TITLE COMPANY,
TRUSTEE; T. P. FAMILY PARTNERSHIP; HOFFBUHER REDI-MIX INC.;
WILLARD M. TUCKER; PHYLLIS 0.
TUCKER; D LAND TITLE COMPANY;
and all unknown persons who
have or claim any right, title
estate, lien or interest in
the subject property,

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION!
OF LAW ON CLAIM AGAINST
D LAND TITLE

Defendants,
D LAND TITLE COMPANY,
Third-Party
Plaintiff,
-vsCivil No. 8978

NORMA S. WANLASS,
Third-Party
Defendant.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing
before the Honorable Don V. Tibbs, District Judge, sitting at

- no -

- 2Manti, Sanpete County, State of Utah, on Monday, the 10th day o
February, 1986•

The Plaintiff appeared through its attorneys

Brent D. Young and Jerry L. Reynolds of Ivie & Young, 48 Nort
University Avenue, P.O. Box 672, PrOvo, Utah and the Defendant
T.P. Family Partnership appeared through its attorney, Phillip L
Foremaster, and Defendant Willard H. Tucker appeared in perso
and with his attorney, Phillip L<
Daniel

Pack

having

appeared

Foremaster, and Defendan

through

his

attorney, Mark

F

Robinson, and Plaintiff and the parties Defendant, with th<
exception

of

D

Land

Title

having

settled

their

claims b;

stipulation and D Land Title and Cross-Defendant Norma Wanlas,
having stipulated that any issues remaining upon the crossclaii
be reserved for further proceedings and the Court having hear<
the sworn testimony

and having

examined exhibits offered ii

support of Plaintiff's claim against D Land Title and havinj
introduced

documentary

evidence

atxd

the

Court

having

hear<

arguments of counsel and being fully advised, now makes th<
following:
FINDINGS OF tfACT
1.

D Land Title Company, 4 regularly-appointed Trustee

and record owner of real property by reason of a Trust Deec
executed by T, P. Family Partnership and recorded August 31, 1981
in Book 228 on Pages 534 and 535 of the records of Sanpete
County,

State of Utah, which

Trust

Deed

included

title tc

property located in Sanpete County, State of Utah, described as
follows:

- 3The Northeast Quarter of the Southwest Quarter
of the Northwest Quarter of Section 23,
Township 12 South, Range 5 East, Salt Lake
Base and Meridian,
2.

Plaintiff

acquired

an

interest

in and

to

th

property specifically described in Paragraph 1 above and include
in the described Trust Deed; Margaret A, Gunterman, a Beneficiar
under the terms of the Trust Deed described in Paragraph 1 above
specifically

executed

a

Partial

Release

and

Request

fo

Reconveyance of the property described in Finding No, 1.

Th<

Deed of Partial Release and Partial Reconveyance was executed b;
D Land Title on or about the 16th day of December, 1983, an<
thereafter recorded on the 29th day of May, 1984 in Book 253
Page 431 of the records of Sanpete County, State of Utah.
3.

There was no

intervening

conveyance of a rea'

property interest by any party between the 16th day of December
1983 and the 29th day of May, 1984 and the Deed of Partia"
Reconveyance

herein

identified

transferred

legal

title

an<

released all interest in and to real property in Sanpete County
State of Utah and specifically described as follows:
The Northeast Quarter of the Southwest Quarter
of the Northwest Quarter of Section 23,
Township 12 South, Range 5 East, Salt Lake
Base and Meridian.
4. That because the Deed of Partial Release hereii
identified

was

effective

and

//c2 -

did

fully

reconvey

the

- 4property identified, the Plaintiff was not damaged in any respec
by the fact that the document was not recorded until May 29
1984.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court does no'
enter the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
A.

Plaintiff has proved no damage by reason of acts

omissions or conduct on the part of D Land Title and tha
Defendant D Land Title is entitled to a judgment of no cause o:
action, together with its costs incurred.
B.
the

In view of the findings and conclusions reached

crossclaim

heretofore

filed

by

D

Land

Title

againsi

cross-defendant Norma Wanlass should be dismissed since D Lane
Title suffered no damage.
DATED t h i s

*eaiP
-

/IS -

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SANPETE COUNTY,
r

STATE OF UTAH

•" '

/*

* * * * * * * * * * * *
"%J^M>TU^ J&MCJL,

SOUTH SANPITCH COMPANY,

)

Plaintiff,
-vsDANIEL PACK; MARGARET A.
GUNTERMAN; ACTION TITLE COMPANY,)
TRUSTEE; T. P. FAMILY PARTNERSHIP; HOFFBUHER REDI-MIX INC.;
WILLARD M. TUCKER; PHYLLIS 0.
TUCKER; D LAND TITLE COMPANY;
and all unknown persons who
have or claim any right, title
estate, lien or interest in
the subject property,

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION TO VACATE PREVIOUSLYEXECUTED FI _INGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
JUDGMENT AND DENYING
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO AMEND
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
JUDGMENT

Defendants,
D LAND TITLE COMPANY,
Third-Party
Plaintiff,
-vs-

Civil No. 8978

NORMA S. WANLASS,
Third-Party
Defendant,

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing
before the Honorable Don V. Tibbs, District Judge, sitting at Manti,
Sanpete County, State of Utah, on Wednesday, the 2nd day of April,
1986, the matter having come before the Court upon Plaintiff's
Motion
Judgment

to Vacate Findings
heretofore

of Fact

executed by

and

Conclusions

the Court

of Law and

and upon Plaintiff's

further Motion to amend Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and

901

- /J? -

r

>

- 2Judgment.

The Court being fully advised in the matter does now
ORDER:
1.

Plaintiff's Motion to Vacate Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law and Judgment is hereby denied.
2.

Plaintiff's separate Motion to amend Findings of Fact

and Conclusions of Law and Judgment is hereby denied.

~/3f-

BRENT D. YOUNG
JERRY L. REYNOLDS
IVIE & YOUNG
Attorneys for Plaintiff
48 North University Avenue
P.O. Box 672
Provo, UT
84603
Telephone: 375-3000

ituJll

COJCX in A"

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SANPETE ^OUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SOUTH SANPITCH COMPANY,
Plaintiff,
vs.

PARTIAL JUDGMENT

DANIEL PACK, MARGARET A.
GUNTERMAN: ACTION TITLE COMPANY,
Trustee; T.P. FAMILY PARTNERSHIP,
HOFFBUHER REDI-MIX INC., WILLARD
M. TUCKER, PHYLLIS 0. TUCKER: D
LAND TITLE COMPANY, and all
unknown persons who have or
claim any right, title, estate,
lien or interest in the subject
property,

C i v i l No. 8978

Defendants.
Based upon the stipulation of the plaintiff and defendants
Daniel Pack and Action Title Company, ^nd based upon the
evidence presented at trial on February 10, 1986, and for good
cause showing IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:

1.

That title to the following described real property

located in Sanpete County, State of Ut£h is quieted in plaintiff
or their grantees as against the defendants and each of their.
The Northeast one quarter of the Southwest one
quarter of the Northwest one quarter of Section
23, Township 12 South, Range 5 East, Salt Lake
Base and Meridian; according to the official plat
thereof on file in the office of the Recorder,
Sanpete County, State of Utah.
Containing ten acres more or less*

-

/33 -

92&

^w*
2.

•f-

:k/; ii
That defendant, Daniel Pack/,
is granted an easement

over an existing dirt roadway across the above described real
property for purposes of maintenance of said road and ingress
and egress to a cabin on nearby property known as the Hudson
Cabin.
3.

That defendant Pack is granted an easement to maintain

and existing plastic pipe waterline acposs the above described
real property and to the right substitute therefore another
waterline of the same size provided that said waterline is
buried.

Said waterline presently crosses the above described

property and leads to the aforementioned Hudson cabin.
1986.

& ***** x- .

\ *~ *

MARK F. ROBINSON
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